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IN THE. SUPREME. COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

LOWELL V. PARRISH, EMILY
L. PARRISH, his wife, V ADAL
PETERSON, and MELVA
PETERSON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appeltants,
-vs.-

Case
No. 8690

HARLOW G. RlC'HARDS and MRS.
HARLOW G. RICHARDS,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This was an action to enjoin maintenance of a
structure and fence built in violation of a real property
restrictive covenant ,and a Salt Lake City ordinance (R.
1-4). From a judgment of dismissal, no cause of action
(R. 204), plaintiffs appeal (R. 211).
The parties are owners of real property located
within N orthcrest Subdivision, an exclusive residential
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area located high in the avenues of Salt Lake City. The
properties owned by the parties are contiguous and are
located in the 600 block of "I" Street. Plaintiffs Peterson's ,own p,roperty is located at 671 "I" Street; defendants' property is located immediately to the north at
685 "I" Street; and the p,roperty of the plaintiffs Parrish
is immediately to the north of that, at 699 "I" Street.
Immediately to the west of defendants' Northcrest property is a strip of land 15.2 feet wide located outside the
N orthcre.st subdivision (Findings No. 2 and 3, R. 195196).
The subdivider of N orthcrest, prior to acquisition of
the properties by the parties to this action, had recorded
a restrictive covenant relating to the uses to which properties in the subdivision might be put (Exhibit 2). The
covenant contained the following paragraph:

"USE OF LAND: Each lot in said subdivision is here by designated as a re.sidential lot,
and none of the said lots shall be improved, used
or occupied for other than private single family
residence purposes~ and no flat or apartment
house intended for residence purposes shall be
erected thereon, and no structure ~hall be erected
or placed on any of said lots other than a one,
t"To, or three ear garage, and one single family
d'velling, not to exeeed one story in height, except
that on tho~e lots "There the finished ground
8h•va tion i~ at least one story lo,Yer on one side
or thf\ d\\TPlling than on the opposite side, the
d'vPlling n1ay extend t\\To stories above the
f.iuisbPd ground elevntion on such lo,Yer side/'
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The "Restriction Agreement" also contained provisions regulating the width of front and side lots; prohibiting further subdivision, conduct of trade or business,
nuisances, existence of temporary buildings, and the
keeping of certain animals or fowls; establishing minimum floor space; and conferring upon owners of the
various lots the right to enforce the agreement.
The S.alt Lake City Revised Ordinances of 1955 contain a provision regulating the height of fences. Section
51-4-4 reads as follows:
"No fence or wall or other similar structure
shall be erected in any required front yard as defined herein to a height in excess of four ( 4) feet;
nor shall any fence or wall or other similar structure be erected in any side or rear y.ard to a height
in excess of six ( 6) feet. Where there is a difference in the grade of the properties on either side,
of the fence or wall, the height of the fence or wall
shall be measured from the average grade of the
adjoining properties."
On about February 18, 1954, defendants were considering building a tennis court upon their lot. They
discussed the building restrictions with Lynn S. Richards, Willard R. Smith .and 1\tfr. and Mrs. Vincent Rees;
a few days later they discussed the project with plaintiffs (Interrogatory No. 10, R. 16, 18). The plaintiffs
protested construction of the tennis court. On March 22,
1954, they sent a letter to Dr. Richard.s outlining their
reasons for opposing construction of the tennis court
and enclosing an opinion from the Salt Lake City law
firm of Dickson, Ellis, Parsons & McCre.a that con-
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struction of the tennis court would violate the restrictive
covenant and would require a permit for construction of
a fence more than six feet in height (Exhibit 15).
Although nothing was done immediately about
building the tenni.s court, the plan ap,parently remained.
On about July 20, 1955, construction of the tennis court
began (Interrogatory No. 9, R. 16, 18). On August 2,
1955, counsel for the plaintiffs wrote to the defendants,
telling them that the plaintiffs intended to take every
possible step to prevent construction of the tennis court
(Exhibit 14).
The tennis court was located in the southwest corner
of the defendants' properties ju.st inside the south and
west boundaries (Interrogatory No. 13, R. 16, 19). The
dimensions of the court are 78 by 36 feet, surrounded by
a fence having dimensions of 100 by 50 feet (Interrogatory Nos. 12, 15, R. 16, 19). Prior to construction of the
tennis court the defendants had changed the contours of
their property, raising the property level various distances from 6 inches at the \Yest end to 36 inches at a
point approximately 45 feet west of the east boundary.
A retaining \vall \Yas constructed a few feet north of, and
exceeding the height of a retaining ,v-all already existing
on the Peterson boundary (Interrogator)~ No. 18, R. 16,
19; R. 141). Atop the retaining \Yall the defendants
erected a six-foot high ehain link fence (Interrogatory
No. 15, R. 16, 19). The tennis court and fence rise above
the Peterson property~ they separate the Parrish property fron1 the valley belo\v (Exhibits 8 and 9).
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The properties of the parties are located on hilly
terrain which slope.s downward from North to South.
Prior to construction a certain amount of leveling was
necessary (R. 139, 140). The top of the defendants' present retaining wall is somewhat above the "natural''
grade. The evidence, with reference to the present grade,
shows that the top of defendants' retaining wall is a.p'proximaJtely four f.eet above the Peterson lawn (R. 108)
and about two and one-half feet above the Peterson retaining wall at one point (R. 149). The six foot chain
link fence is located upon the retaining wall (R. 104).
Existence of the tennis court and fence diminishes the
value of plaintiffs' properties (R. 110, 130-133).
Defendants were permitted to show that certain
other owners within N orthcrest Subdivision had constructed swimming pools and high fences (R. 167-178),
but there is no evidence that the character of the neighborhood has been changed by the swimming pools or
fences. Mr. Richards didn't know how many house.s there
were in Northcrest Subdivision (R. 178). It was shown,
also, that the Petersons, together with their neighbor to
the west, erected a temporary chain link fence which, together with the retaining wall, exceeds the height of six
feet (R. 118-119) ; and thrut Parrish, with the consent of
the neighbor to the north, has a short length of fence
which may exceed six feet in height above the pre.sent
grade (R. 144, 185-186). The trial court held that these
facts were sufficient to estop the plaintiffs from asserting that the defendants' fence violates the Salt Lake City
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ordinance and that the defendants' structure violates
the restriction agreement (R. 201) .
STATEMEN'T OF POINTS
1. The defendants' tennis court is prohibited by the
re.striction agreement for N orthcrest Subdivision.
2. The defendants' chain link fence is prohibited by
the Salt Lake City Revised Ordinances of 1955, Section
51-4-4.
3. The court erred in applying the doctrine of estoppel as against the plaintiffs.
ARGUMENT

I.
'THE DEFENDANTS' TENNIS COURT IS PROHIBITED
BY ~THE RESTRICTION AGREEMENT FOR NORTH·CREST
SUBDIVISION.

There is no dispute as to the language of the covenant. It provides that "no flat or apartment" and "no
structure shall be erected or placed on any of said lots"
other than one gar.age and a single-fan1ily d\Yelling. The
court below took the vie"~ that the tennis court constructed and 1naint.ained by the defendants is not a ~~struc
ture", and, that if it is, the Parrish high board fence is,
too ( Conelu.sions 6 and 7, R. 202, 203).
There is no doubt that the grantor n1eant to prohibit son1cth in!J. Did he 1nean only to prohibit things
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"like apartments"~ Or did he me1an to permit only
hou.ses with g.arages ~
Ca.ses construing the word "building" have found it
broad enough to include many things besides houses.
We submit that the word "structure" has a broader meaning than the word "building" and that certain things
which are not properly "buildings" may be "structures"
within the usually accepted meaning, and within the
meaning of the grantors involved in this case. Katsoff
v. Lucertini (1954), 141 Conn. 74, 103 A. 2d 812, 814.
The case.s construing the meaning of the word "building"
are, therefore, relevant but not controlling. In construing
the meaning of the words used in a restrictive covenant
the apparent me.aning of the word "user" must be considered. Katsoff v. LucertiniJ Supra.
In the present case the following appear to be important: The subdivision is an exclusive residential area;
buildings must be .set hack at least twenty-five feet from
the front line and eight feet from the side lot line;
nothing may be done on the lots "which may be or become
an annoyance or a nuisance to the neighborhood; the
lots are only moderate in size; and the restrictions were
meant to enhance the value of the properties. It was
apparently meant to enhance the value of all the properties; admittedly a structure in violation of the covenant might enhance the v.alue of the offending property
while causing depreciation in the value of the other properties.
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There are many cases ap,plying various type,s of
restrictions to various types of structures. While none
have been found which are on all fours with the present
case, many are enlightening.
In Hulett v. Borough of Sea Girt (1930), 150 Atl.
202, 106 N. J. Eq. 118, it was held that the word "structure" as used in a deed should be taken to mean something that will interfere with the u.se of the street or will
obstruct the view.
And in Kararek v. Peier (1900), 22 Wash. 419, 61
Pac. 33, 50 L.R.A. 345, it was held that a structure "is
any production or piece of work artificially built up or
composed of parts joined together in some definite
manner and in such a sense a fence is a structure." In
construing a zoning ordinance the Supreme Court of
Michigan held that a structure is "any production or
piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts
joined together in .some definite manner." C. K. Eddy, et
al. v. Tierney, et. al. (1936), 276 ~{ich. 233, 267 N.W. 852,
855; Detroit Trust Co. v. Austin 1939, 291 Mich. 523, 289
N.W. 239.
A number of cases construing restrieti\e covenants as relating to fenees and "~ans are found in an
annotation in 23 A.L.R. 2d 937 et seq.; and an annotation
on covenants relating to "buildings'' is found in 49 A.L.R.
1364 et seq.
In this ease the defendants haYe constructed a

1nas1sive concrete structure.

I~t

is bounded on three sides
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by substantial re.rbaining walls. On the north the retaining walls protrude upw.ard from the court. On the west
and south they sup·port the court. Conneeted to these
massive retaining wall s is a large apron of concrete-.
Attached to that are steel pos~ts and a ch~ain link fence
on some sides and a concrete w.all on others. The structure as constructed has a foundartion, retbaining walls,
and certainly goes beyond merely an ~apron of concrete.
The nature of what has been constructed i s best deis ..
cribed by reference to the various photographs which
were in evidence. We respectfully submit that the
"thing" constructed is a structure within the me~Rning
of the restrictive covenant.
1

1

There is a very recent Utah case, Hargraves v.
Young (1956), 3 Utah 2d 175, 280 P. 2d 974, which was
conce·rned with a definition of structures. The court there
held that .a canopy was a structure within the meaning
of certain city ordinances. A pi0ture of the canopy is
reported with the case, and we submit that the "thing"
constructed by the defendants as shown by the pictures
in evidence· in this case is a structure within the me'aning of Hargraves v. Young.
II
THE DEFENDANTS' CHAIN LINK FENCE IS PROHIBITED BY 'THE SALT LAKE CI:Ty REVISED OR.DINANCES OF 1955, SECTION 51-4-4.

It is undisputed that the chain link fence erected by
defendants is six feet in height-e·xclusive of the retain-
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ing wall upon which it .stands. The evidence also establishes that the retaining wall, at some points, is as much
as thirty-six inches higher than the natural grade of the
land; and that the retaining wall of defendants is about
four feet high when measured from the Peterson lawn
(R. 108, Exhibits 3 through 10); it is also about four feet
higher than the sidewalk it intersects.
Section 51-4-4 of the 1955 ordinances of Salt Lake
City provides that side yard fences shall not exceed the
height of six feet. It also provides that ""~here there is a
difference in the grade of the properties on either side of
the fence" the height of the fence ' shall be measured from
the average grade of the adjoining properties." The ordinance does not define "average grade"-but it is rea.sonable to construe it to mean the average between the two
innnediately adjacent parcels of property, that is, the
grade "-ithin a fe,,~ feet of the fence. So construed the
ordinance is purposeful: if construed to mean that the
aYerage is deter1nined by adding together all elevations
present in the neighboring parcels and dividing them by
the nu1nber of elevations~ the ordinance is not only un"~orkahle but serYes no purpose. ·The average grade is
i1nportant "~hen one property is innnediately do"\\rnhill
fron1 anotlH'r. ,,. .ithout an average grade provision one
property o\\-ner could be con1pletely dominated by vrhat
Ill<'a~ures out .as a six foot fence. Unless a·v·erage grade is
taken to r(.'fer to the inunediate difference in the adjoining properti(~s, a. property o\rner "'"ould be able to use
high land on the north of his property as a basis for con11
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Btructing .a fifteen or twenty foot fence on the south of hls
property. The ordinance would then become-as defendants would have us believe it is~an absurdity offering
no protection to downhill owners.
The record, with its devotion to testimony about
natural grades and cuts and fills, tends to obscure a very
real fact about the defendants' property and their fence.
The retaining wall rises about four feet above the Peterson lawn; ·and the six foot fence sits atop the wall. The
Petersons thus encounter what is, from their point of
view, a ten foot fence. For them it has all the characteristics of a ten foot fence.
We believe the ordinance was meant to protect a
downhill owner, and to protect him against fences built
upon property the way it exists at the time the fence is
built. But even if the natural grade is considered important, the testimony of defendants' own witness,
Georgius Y. Cannon, shows that the fence rises more than
six feet above the natural grade.
The defendants' retaining wall is higher than the
sidewalk at a point where an exten.sion of the retaining
wall would meet the sidewalk. We believe the sidew.alk
represents, roughly, the "average grade" between the
two properties. An earlier Salt Lake City Ordinance,
Section 6713 of the Revised Ordinances of 1944, seems
to bear this out. This section defines the terms "established grade" and "grade" to mean "the elevation of the
.sidewalk .at the center of that wall adjoining the street."
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Under the evidence the court erred in failing to find
that the defendants' fence is more than six feet above the
average grade of the adjoining properties, and that it
violates the ordinances of Salt Lake City.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN APPLYING 'THE DOCTRINE
OF ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS.

The trial court ruled that the existence of a high
board fence on the Parrish property, and a high link
fence on the rear of the Peterson property, estopped the
plaintiffs from asserting that the defendants' fence violates the zoning ordinance (R. 201). The court also ruled
that if the tennis court was a "structure", so was the
high board fence maintained by plaintiff Parrish, and
that all the plaintiffs, because of the high board fence,
are estopped from asserting that the tennis court violates
the restriction agreement for N orthcrest Subdivision (R.
202).
If applied by the court below, the doctrine of estoppel would become a scattergun doctrine. The court has
talren conduct not attributable to some of the plaintiffs,
co1nbined it "~ith other conduct which ha.s invaded no
one's rights, and used it as a con1plete bar to enforcement
of rights the plaintiffs thought they had.
The evidence is undisputed that the Parrish fence is
on the downhill (not the uphill) side of th:e adjoining
property; it is a short fence used n1ore as a decoration
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than anything ,else (Exhibit 17); it was built with the
concurrence of the uphill neighbor and partly as a concession to him.
The chain link fence at the rear of the Peterson
property was built by Peter.son and the adjoining landowner as a cooperative project. The f1ence was temporary and for the purpose of keeping small children from
being hurt (R. 118-119). It w,as to be remove.d as soon as
the adjoining landowner w:as able to build a house on his
now vacant property.
How can these facts estop the plaintiffs~ Assuming
the plaintiffs' fences violate the Salt Lake City ordinance, who has been harmed by them~ The only p·ersons
who might hav;e a right to complain have acquiesced and
joined in construction and maintenance of the fences.
The fence·s do not harm defendants, indeed are far re.moved from the defendants' property. Defendants. have
not even claimed to have been adViersly affected by the
fences.
It has long been held the pr~v.ate properrty owners
may use the injunction as a means of enforcing zoning
ordinances. The ha.sis of the right, howerver, is that
some special damage, by way ·of diminution in value of
his property has been or will be suffered by him as a result of the violation of the particular zoning ordinance~.
See annotation, "Injunction ,as a Remedy for Violation of
a Zoning Ordinance," 54 A.L.R. 366, and 129 A.L.R. 885 ;
2 Metzenbaum's Law of Zoning (2nd Ed.) 1020; 2 Yok-
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ley's Zoning Law and Practice (2nd Ed.) 7; and 58 Am.
Jur., Zoning§ 189 et seq.
The basis of the right to enforce zoning ordinances
is important because of the basis for applying the doctrine of estoppel. It is well established that in order to
apply the doctrine of estoppel a wrong ''must have been
done to the defendant himself and not to some third
par~ty." 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 399, p. 99;
4 A.L.R. 58 (Annotation). If the right to enforce a zoning
ordinance were based upon the plaintiff's status as a political member of the community, rather than upon his
status as a wronged property owner, it would probably
be true that any similar violation of the zoning ordinance
would bar him from maintaining an action to enjoin a
violation by another. But the right is one based upon
protection from special damages arising out of violation
of the ordinance. The plaintiffs have proved special
damages. There is testimony that the value of their properties has been dilninished because of the existenee of
the tennis court and fence.
With reference to the fences maintaind by plaintiffs,
there is no sil11ilar testimony. The e"'ridence, in fact, tends
to show that the fences tend to enhance the yalues of the
adjoining property and haYe been placed tl1ere "ith the
advice and consent of the other O\Yners. Defendants have
claiined no drunage.
Th·e court's ruling that the partie.s .are estopped from
asserting that the tennis court is a ·~structure" 'vithin the
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meaning of the restrictive covenant is erroneous on yet
another ground. The estoppel in this instance is based
upon the fact that the plaintiffs Parrish have maint aine.d
a high bo.ard fence conne:cted to his house, and that the
1

fence is a "structure" if the tennis court is. There is no
similar finding with respect to anything done or maintained by the Petersons. How can the P~arrish fence
estop the Petersons ~ There is no community of interest,
though the aetion was properly brought because arising
out of the same transaction or occurrence. Thus, while
the P~arrish structu:ve might e.st:op the Parrishes it should
not estop the Petersons. There is no e,vidence that defendants were misled. The restriction agreement expressly provides that failure to take action in event of a
violation shall not be a waiver of the right to enforce as
against future violations (Exhibit 2, p. 3). From the
beginning, plaintiffs made known to defendants their
oppo.sition to the structure.
CONCLUSION
Construction of the covenant and ordinance are
matters of law, not fact. The tennis court and fence
maintained by defendants violates both the N orthcrest
Subdivision restriction agreement and the Salt Lake City
ordinances. The structure was erected and is maintained
over the strong protest:s of the defendants neighbors.
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Mor,eover, the existence of the structure has depreciated
the value of th!e real prope:rties owned by the plaintiffs.
The estopp·el found by the trial court is "estoppel in the
air" and is contrary to the doctrine of estoppel as tra~
ditionally applie:d.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed
and the court directed to enter a decree enj~oining defendants from maintaining the tennis court and the fence.
Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD W. CLYDE
BRYCE E. ROE
of Clyde &·Mecham
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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